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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Tin ilidml H nun t literal il . IIIIUIULUIUL > UIJLI IJIJLIIIIIL LU'lmdiiiil I'IMUI
Motion to Dismiss and Related Rulings ("Order'* on September 20, 2006. [Record on
Appeal ("R ") 1877-79, Addendum ("Add

i A heretoj.1 Pursuant to Utah R. App. P.

5(a), plaintiff/appellant Richard Davis ("Dav.

nil Ins Petition I' m IV-mnssum

to Apprjil 1111"111 liifnlni li'lof ," Order in liif,", l 'nui'l on October 6, 2006. On December 6,
2006, this Court issued its Order granting Davis' Petition. This Court has jurisdiction over
this appeal from the interlocutory Order pursuant to t um * ^JC Ann §• , 5 _ _, j; .
ST ATEMENT OF ISSUE, PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented is whether the District Court erred in ruling that the statute
of limitations apphcaDie u,.. ^UHA c-i;k; >ung a municipal amie xatioii "s llic geueiii! I J '
year catch

tah Code < -- V "'S-l? 25f3), rather than 'the one year statute

in former § 10-2-403 (1977) and present § 10-2-422, specifically directed to municipal
annexations. This issue was preserved in the District Coui t (R. 1 5 80 8' I )

I he issue is

cuit" wl '.lai'tilui \ ^iiL'.li'iidiuii Milj|c-t L A L/H //.J! I • .'.ttiirJar.J I ,ip|\ II,il • review

Sec,

Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \ 17, vr. P.2d 1201.

1

Unless otherwise indicated, references to the record on appeal are to the record in
Civil No. 000403760, which was consolidated with Civil No. 050403416.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-403 {Laws of Utah 1977, Chapter 48, Section 2)
provided:
Whenever the inhabitants of any territory annexed to any
municipality pay property tax levied by the municipality for
one or more years following the annexation and no
inhabitants of the territory protests [sic] the annexation
during the year following the annexation, the territory shall
be conclusively presumed to be properly annexed to the
annexing municipality.
The current equivalent at Utah Code Ann, § 10-2-422 similarly provides:
An area annexed to a municipality under this part shall be
conclusively presumed to have been validly annexed if:
(1) the municipality has levied and the taxpayers within the
area have paid property taxes for more than one year after
annexation; and
(2) no resident of the area has contested the annexation in a
court of proper jurisdiction during the year following
annexation.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) provides: "An action may be brought within four
years: . . . (3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 provides: "Civil actions may be commenced only
within the periods prescribed in this Chapter, after the cause of action has accrued,
except in specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This action involves disputes between Davis, defendant/appellee, Provo City
Corporation ("Provo City") and various other parties in the District Court (who are not
2

parties to this appeal) concerning real property Davis owns in Rock Canyon, Utah
County, Utah (the "Property") (R. 417-78). The disputes relevant to this appeal pertain
to Provo City's purported annexation of the Property.
Davis' Seventh Cause of Action in his Amended and Supplemental Complaint in
this action ("Amended Complaint") contends that Provo City's purported annexation
was illegal and is void and of no effect with respect to the Property, for two reasons.
First, Davis contends that the annexation petitions were not signed by the requisite
number of real property owners, under the provisions of the former Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-2-401 in effect at the time {Laws of Utah 1917, Chapter 48, Section 2). Second,
Davis contends that the purported annexation left unincorporated islands in Provo City,
in violation of former § 10-2-402 (Laws of Utah 1917, Chapter 48, Section 2). (R.
465-66)
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below2
Davis filed this action in November, 2000 (R. 1-8). After changing counsel (R.
202-03), Davis filed his Amended Complaint in November 2005 (R. 417-78).
Among other things, Davis' Amended Complaint added Provo City, Red Slab,
LLC ("Red Slab") and John L. Valentine ("Valentine"), a member and manager of Red
Slab, as defendants (R. 417-78).3 In December 2005, Provo City moved to dismiss
2

Davis will address only those proceedings in the District Court that may relate to this
appeal or provide necessary background.

3

In April, 2006 this case (Civil No. 000403760) was consolidated with Civil No.
050403416, in which Red Slab is the plaintiff and Davis is the defendant (R. 1751,
1764-65).
3

Davis' Seventh Cause of Action against Provo City (discussed above) (R. 516-532).
Provo City argued, among other things, that the Seventh Cause of Action is barred by
the one year statute of limitations in effect at the time of the purported annexation,
former Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-403 {Laws of Utah 1977, Chapter 48, Section 2)
(quoted above) (R. 527-29).
In his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Davis argued, among
other things, that his Seventh Cause of Action was not time barred under former
§ 10-2-403 (1977) (or present § 10-2-422, also quoted above), because Provo City had
never levied property taxes against the Property after he acquired it in 1998 (R. 716-17,
721, 741-51).4 As Ex. A to its reply memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss,
Provo City filed the Affidavit of Paul Bredthauer, conceding Provo City had never
assessed city property taxes against the Property after it was purportedly annexed in
1978 (but intended to do so in 2006) (R. 1060-62, Add. B hereto).
During oral argument on Provo City's motion to dismiss, Provo City argued for
the first time that if Davis' Seventh Cause of Action was not time barred by former
§ 10-2-403, it was barred by either the three year statute of limitations in present Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1), applicable to actions for "injury to real property," or the

4

Davis also sought discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (R. 752-57). However, the
only discovery Davis sought regarding the issue on this appeal was whether Provo City
assessed property taxes against the owners of the annexed property, and whether any
such property taxes were paid. Given Provo City's admission that it has never assessed
Davis' Property (discussed below), this discovery probably became unnecessary.
4

four year catch-all statute of limitations in present § 78-12-25(3), applicable to actions
"for relief not otherwise provided for by law" (R. 1783-84). Because these issues had
not been briefed by either Davis or Provo City, the Court directed both parties to file
supplemental memoranda on these issues (R. 1751, 1783-84), which both parties did5
(R. 1780-84, 1788-97).
On June 28, 2006, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision (R. 1838-42,
Add. C hereto), ruling that Davis' Seventh Cause of Action was barred by the four year
catch-all statute of limitations in § 78-12-25(3). The Memorandum Decision also
directed " . . . Provo City to prepare an order for the Court's signature consistent with
this decision" (Memorandum Decision, Add. C hereto, R. 1839).6 Provo City prepared
the Order, to which Davis objected and presented his own proposed order7 (R. 184562). The Court denied Davis' objections and entered the Order (as proposed by Provo

5

In its supplemental memorandum, Provo City did not pursue its argument that present
§ 78-12-26(1) might apply (R. 1788-97).

6

In the Memorandum Decision, the District Court indicated that Provo City had not
levied property taxes on the Property after Davis acquired it (in 1998) (Memorandum
Decision, Add. C hereto, R. 1840-42). However, as indicated above, Provo City
conceded it has never assessed property taxes on the Property, at any time after the
1978 annexation, through 2005 (R. 1060-62, Add. B hereto).
7

Among other things, Davis requested the District Court to certify its Order as final
for purposes of immediate appeal under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (R. 1845-62), which the
District Court declined to do. (R. 1877-79, Add. A hereto.)
5

City) on September 20, 2006, dismissing Davis' Seventh Cause of Action based upon
the four year statute of limitations.8 (R. 1877-79, Add. A hereto.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are material to a consideration of the issue presented and the
Order that is the subject of the appeal:
Davis acquired the Property in April, 1998. He owns at least a 50% undivided
interest in the Property, and has record title to a 75% undivided interest. Red Slab has
record title to an undivided 25% interest in the Property, and claims it has the right to
acquire another 25% undivided interest.9 Davis disputes all of Red Slab's claims of
ownership. Red Slab also purported to convey a conservation easement to Provo City,
and Davis also disputes the validity of that conservation easement10 (R. 813-19, 788801).
In January, 1978, Provo City purported to annex a portion of the Property (R.
472). However, as discussed above, Provo City admits that it never assessed city

8

The District Court did not rule upon the other issues raised by Provo City's motion to
dismiss, and denied Davis' Rule 56(f) request for discovery. (R. 1877-79, Add. A
hereto.)
9

Defendant Greg Sperry had a prior claim of ownership that is not relevant to this
appeal.
10

The disputes between Davis, on the one side, and Provo City, Red Slab and
Valentine, on the other side, mainly involve Davis' desire to quarry the large volume of
valuable quartzite rock on his Property in Rock Canyon, and the desire of Provo City,
Red Slab and Valentine to prevent Davis from doing so.
6

property taxes against the Property, after the purported 1978 annexation (R. 1060-62,
Add. B hereto).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court erred because § 78-12-25(3) does not apply. Under
§ 78-12-1, the statutes of limitations in Chapter 12 of Title 78 do not apply " . . . where
a different limitation is prescribed by statute." Also, this Court has held that
§ 78-12-25(3) applies only to claims that are not subject to a more specific statute of
limitations. Here, former § 10-2-403 (1977) and current § 10-2-422 are different,
more specific statutes of limitation that expressly apply to Davis' claim contesting
Provo City's purported annexation of his Property. This analysis is also supported by
persuasive case law from another jurisdiction. Thus, these are the statutes that apply,
not § 78-12-25(3).
Moreover, it is undisputed that Provo City never levied property taxes against
the Property. Thus, as a matter of law, Davis' claim is not time barred by eitfier
former § 10-2-403 (1977), or present § 10-2-422.
ARGUMENT
THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION ARE
FORMER § 10-2-403 (1977) AND CURRENT § 10-2-422,
WHICH SPECIFICALLY GOVERN CHALLENGES TO
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATIONS, NOT THE GENERAL
CATCH-ALL STATUTE IN § 78-12-25(3)
In Quick Safe-T Hitch v. RSB SystemsL.C., 2000 UT 84, 1 15, 12 P.3d 577,
this Court held that § 78-12-25(3) applies only to " . . . claims for which the legislature

7

has not enacted a more specific statute restricting the time in which a particular claim
may be brought." The Court relied in part on § 78-12-1 and reasoned as follows:
Section 78-12-1 of the Utah Code mandates that civil
actions "may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter . . . except in specific cases where
a different limitation is prescribed by statute." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-1 (1996). Moreover, section 78-12-25(3)
provides, "An action may be brought within four years:
. . . (3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law." Id.
§ 78-12-25(3). The plain language of these two sections
clearly requires that section 78-12-25(3)'s four-year "catchall" statute of limitations be applied to claims for which the
legislature has not enacted a more specific statute restricting
the time in which a particular claim may be brought.
2000 UT 84,1 15 (emphasis added)
Here, the legislature enacted former § 10-2-403 (1977) and current § 10-2-422
(both quoted above), which are different and more specific statutes restricting the time
in which a claim protesting an annexation may be brought. Thus, those statutes apply,
not § 78-12-25(3).n See also, State of South Carolina v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d

11

In performing the research for Davis' supplemental memorandum in the District
Court, Davis1 counsel came across Mesa Development Co., Inc. v. Sandy City Corp.,
948 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1997), which indicates that under former Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-2-423 (1996), a successor statute to former Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-403 (1977),
only a "resident" of the annexed property has standing to protest an annexation. Mesa
does not apply here for several reasons. First, it is a decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, not this Court, and attempts to distinguish several of this Court's cases that
recognize a property owner's standing to contest an annexation. See, 948 P.2d at 370,
n. 2. Second, Mesa held that it is the statute in effect at the time of the annexation that
applies. The statute at issue there used the term "resident," while the statute in effect at
the time of the annexation here [former § 10-2-403 (1977)] uses the term "inhabitant."
Mesa stated that a "resident" is "more than a mere inhabitant" (948 P.2d at 369),
without further defining what an "inhabitant" is. Third, if there were no "inhabitants"
of the annexed property here (however that term is defined), at the time of annexation,
8

408, 411-412, 414-415 (S.C. 2000), holding that the specific 90 day statute of
limitations governing annexation protests applied to an action contesting an annexation,
rather than the general, ten year catch-all statute of limitations; Carter v. University of
Utah Medical Center, 2006 UT 78, 1 9, 150 P.3d 467, in which this Court held that a
more specific venue provision controlled over the general, catch-all venue statute, in
part because, " . . . when we are confronted with two statutory provisions that conflict,
'the more specific in application governs over the more general provision'" (citation
omitted).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the District Court ruled that § 78-12-25(3)
applied, because current § 10-2-422 [and, by implication, former § 10-2-403 (1977)]
are not statutes of limitation, but something different:
The general goals of statutes of limitations are "to
prevent unfair dilatory litigation against a defendant and to
require that claims be litigated while proper investigation
and preservation of evidence can occur." . . . U.C.A. § 102-422 accomplishes neither of these, instead it is a
conclusive limitation that can defeat a challenge to an
annexation, but it does not prevent a challenge, which is the
function of a statute of limitations. Adopting Davis'
interpretation that U.C.A, § 10-2-422 is the proper statute of
limitations in this matter, would allow annexations to be
challenged in perpetuity as long as property taxes were not
levied against a piece of property by Provo City. This
Court finds that this matter falls within the catchall four-year
limitation in U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), barring Davis'
challenge to the 1978 annexation.

this would mean that no owners of the properties purportedly annexed had standing to
contest the annexation, which makes no sense.
9

[June 28, 2006 Memorandum Decision, Add. C hereto, R. 1840 (citation omitted)]
Davis disagrees.
Former § 10-2-403 (1977) and current § 10-2-422 impose a one year limitation
on actions to contest a municipal annexation (so long as property taxes are levied and
paid on the annexed property). Thus, they 'prevent unfair dilatory litigation' and
'require that claims be litigated while proper investigation and preservation of evidence
can occur',12 although they do put the burden on the annexing municipality to assess
property taxes on the annexed property, in order to take advantage of the one year
limitation.
The District Court's concern that an annexation could be "challenged in
perpetuity so long as property taxes were not levied" is similarly misplaced. The
legislature decided upon a relatively short statute of limitations (one year) within which
to challenge an annexation, but also decided to require the municipality to assess
property taxes against the annexed property, in order to trigger the application of that
statute. While the District Court apparently disagreed with the legislature's approach,
it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to change it.
Accordingly, former § 10-2-403 (1977) and current § 10-2-422 are the
applicable statutes of limitations. Moreover, it is undisputed that prior to Davis' filing
of his Seventh Cause of Action contesting Provo City's purported annexation of his

12

With all due respect, it is not clear to Davis what the District Court meant when it
stated that current § 10-2-422 "can defeat a challenge to an annexation, but it does not
prevent a challenge."
10

Property, Provo City never levied property taxes against Davis' Property (R. 1060-62,
Add. B hereto). Thus, that cause of action is not time barred by those statutes.13
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the District Court's Order,
rule that the applicable statutes of limitation are former § 10-2-403 (1977) and current
§ 10-2-422, not § 78-12-25(3), and further rule that Davis' Seventh Cause of Action is
not time barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.
DATED this Jfi

day of April, 2007.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

'.syisifr?
/ael N. Zundel
fes A. Boevers
Attorneys for Appellant Richard Davis

13

On the other hand, other owners of property within the annexed area are time
barred, if they have been assessed and paid property taxes on that property.
11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /[/

day of April, 2007,1 caused to be mailed,

first-class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF to the following:
Robert D. West
David C. Dixon
Camille S. Williams
James L. Wilde
Provo City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 1849
351 W. Center Street
Provo, Utah 84603

G:\Jab\Davis, Richard\Sperry\Supreme CourtVAppellant's Opening Brief.wpd
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ADDENDUM "A"

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
o, Utah County, State of Utah
'6^

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD DAVIS
Plaintiff.
vs.
GREG SPERRY, STEPHEN KAPELOW,
LOREN KAPELOW, DESIGN WEST,
LLC, RED SLAB, LLC, JOHN L.
VALENTINE, and PROVO CITY
CORPORATION,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT PROVO'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
AND RELATED RULINGS
Case No. 00403760
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants
Defendant, Provo City Corporation ("Provo"), filed a motion to dismiss the
Seventh Cause of Action in Plaintiff Richard Davis' ("Plaintiff'), Amended and
Supplemental Complaint. In opposing Provo's motion to dismiss, plaintiff also filed a
Rule 56(f) motion and various motions to strike affidavits filed by Provo. Plaintiff and
Provo filed affidavits, pre- and post- hearing memoranda and argued their respective
positions before the Court at oral arguments held on April 13, 2006. The Court read all
memoranda, heard the arguments, and entered a memorandum decision dated June 28,
2006. Deeming itself apprised of the issues before it, the Court enters this Order, the
relevant terms of which are:
1.

Provo's motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action in Plaintiffs

Amended and Supplemental Complaint is granted. That Seventh Cause of Action

against Provo is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as such claim is barred by
the four-year statute of limitations found in U.C.A., § 78-12-25 (3). U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3)
disposes of the issues now before the Court, notwithstanding the arguments plaintiff
asserts as to U.C.A. § 10-2-422 and/or its predecessor § 10-2-403 (1977) 2.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that either present § 10-2-422 or

prior § 10-2-403 (1977) gives him a right in perpetuity to contest an annexation by Provo
which occurred several decades before Plaintiff acquired interests in his property.
3.

As Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Provo is barred by the

statute of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), the Court neither addresses nor dismisses
Provo's alternative arguments of Plaintiffs laches, his failure to file a notice of claim or
his failure to file an undertaking as provided by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
4.

Plaintiffs URCP Rule 56(f) motion is denied because Plaintiff by such

motion seeks only to discover matters applicable to U.C.A. § 10-2-422, which does not
control the facts of or issues in this case, and which request is mooted by this Order.
5.

Plaintiffs motions to strike the affidavits of LaNice Groesbeck, Randall

Covington, Karen Jordan, Camille S. Williams and Rick Romney are all denied as
Plaintiffs objections go to the weight, and not admissibUilyTx£these amaiits^^timony.
Dated thisg^o day ofcJtrly, 20c

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this

day of July, 2006,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Granting

Defendant Provo's Motion to Dismiss and Other Rulings, by first class mail, postage
prepaid to:
David C. Dixon, Esq.
Camille S. Williams, Esq.
James L. Wilde, Esq.
Provo City Attorney's Office
351 West Center Street
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
Michael N. Zundel, Esq.
James A Boevers, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
John L. Valentine, Esq.
Phillip E. Lowry, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
PO. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Steven F. Allred, Esq.
584 State Street, #F
Orem, Utah 84058
DATED this

day of July, 2006.

District Court Clerk
-3-

ADDENDUM "B"

DAVID C. DLXON (#0890)
CAMUXE S. WILLIAMS (#7018)
JAMES L. WILDE (#3465)
Attorneys for Provo City
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 852-6141

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

" T

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD DAVIS
\1 I 11> \ \ 1 1
Plaintiff,
PAUL BREDTHAUER
vs.
GREG SPERRY,, STEPHEN KAPELOW.
LOREN KAPELOW, DESIGN WEST, LLC:
RED SLAB, LLC, JOHN L. VALENTINE,
AND PROVO CITY CORPORATION

Cn il f In 11004037^0

i

Judge JAMES R. TAYLOR

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF

)

PAUL BREDTHAUER, being first duly sworn, deposes on his oath and states:
I

I knowledge of the facts stated below, and am competent

to testify.

1

1 nco

2. I am the Natural Resources Manager for the Utah State Tax Commission (the
Commission"), Property Tax Division.
3. Pursuant to Utah Code § 59-2-201(1 )(e), the Commission assesses all mines and
mining claims at 100 per cent of fair market value.
4. The Commission ordinarily relies upon the counties' mapping of property and
placement in proper taxing districts.
5.

I recently examined the location of the Yellow Jack and the Peay's Dream Mine

claims.
6. Part of each of the above mining claims is in Utah County, and part of each of the
above mining claims is in Provo City.
7. Those claims are split between taxing district 110 (Provo City) and taxing district 35
(Utah County), and that split will be reflected on the 2006 tax notices, and will be valued
accordingly.
8. It appears that in the past the mining claims were incorrectly treated for valuation and
taxation purposes as though they were wholly within taxing district 35 (Utah County).
9. Exempt property, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101, such as that owned by
the federal government, is not valued or assessed by the Commission nor taxed, except as
allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 et seq.
DATED this K)_ day of February, 2006.

PAUL BREDTHAUER
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STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF

On this

)0/fc day of Fe*

who has

proven his identity by presenting government-issued picture identification, personally appeared
before iini und-lii'iicd ll

iifliiln I |i

I

Ilm . •

NOTARY PUBLIC
MARY ANN DAVIS
210 North 1050 Waat
Salt Laka City. Utah 84134
Commiasfort Expires
Fabruary 25. 2007

STATE OF UTAH

xAttMMjM

Residing ai

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:
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ADDENDUM "C

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
_Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

: ''

Richard Davis,

MEMOIt 1, INI pi 1 n\i \\\u x\Kn\n

Date: June 28, 2006

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case H'a; IMOHM/oO

Greg Sperry, et al,

Division VH: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss by Provo City Oral
arguments were held on April 13, 2006 and this matter has been subsequently briefed. For the
reasons stated belov

i.
Factual Background

When reviewing «i H*,l M ' • li* nui;,, 111 J i ourt accepts the factual allegations in the
ij^§ffiplaEiii^

thqse facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a

ligni mosi iavoraDie to tne plaintiff as the nonmoving party." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson.
108 P.3d 741, 743 (Utah 2005). The facts are recited accordingly
a large tract of land known as the Heritage Mountain Annexation. In 1998, Plaintiff Richard
Huvis iii'icl Defendant GP,T ^p , ) f r v

rn ,l,l r

' '' "»t<;iiist • in |IMI(M ih ify! In11- u M|I

(lie Heritage

Mountain Annexation. According to an affidavit by Davis, Provo City has never levied any
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property taxes on the property while he has had an interest. In his amended complaint filed on
November 23,2005, Davis asserts that Provo City's annexation of his property was done
illegally, making the annexation void. Provo City's seeks to dismiss the Seventh Cause of
Action in Davis' amended complaint, the only cause of action against them in this case.
Motion to Dismiss
Provo asserts three different grounds for dismissal: statute of limitations, laches, and the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Davis has filed a U.R.C.P. 56(f) request for extension of
time for discovery for this motion. Beginning with the statute of limitations, Provo asserts that
Davis' claim is barred by a statute of limitations under U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3). In response, Davis
argues that another statute, U.C.A. § 10-2-422, trumps the four-year limitation, allowing him to
still seek relief against Provo.
Under U.C.A § 78-12-1, civil actions "may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter . . . except in specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by
statute." Further, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) provides that "an action may be brought within four
^ ^ ^ P i ^ ^ l ^ t h e r w i s e provided for by law." These sections require that the four-year
limitation "be applied to claims for which the legislature has not enacted a more specific statute
restricting the time in which a particular claim may be brought." Quick Safe-T Hitch. Inc. v.
RSB Svs.. 12 P.3d 577, 579 (Utah 2000).
Provo asserts that the four-year limit applies because a "different hmitation" does not
exist. Davis claims that UCA § 10-2-422 is a "different limitation" under U.C.A. § 78-12-1,
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nutation, u U 1 ^ IU-J ^ A wnich

* I-

was substantively the same statute at the time of annexation, provides:
An area annexed to a municipality under this part [U.C.A. §§ 10-2-401 to 10-2-428] shall
be conclusively presumed to have been validly annexed if:
(1) the municipality has levied and the taxpayers within the area have paid propert) tax ss
for more than one year after annexation; and
(2) no resident of the area has contested the annexation in a court of proper jurisdiction
during the year following annexation.
Because Provo City has never levied taxes on Davis while he has owned the property, the
property cannot be "conclusively presumed to have been validly annexed." Davis asserts that
U.C.A. § 10-2-422 is a statute of limitations that ha s not) e 11 i in against him, alkro ing hi iii t ::
bring suit against the annexation that took place in 1978.
jnenciiil j.'o,iiI", ml 'iliilulr1 I'll In i iii 1 JIIH III1, ,III "to pn I'UII iiiiiiil.iii i li I .ilk u y litigation
against a defendant and to require that claims be litigated while proper investigation and
presen all in oi evidence can occur." Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 993 P.2d 207, 213
(Utah 2000). U.C.A. § 10-2-422 accomplishes neither of these, instead it is a concli isive

is the function ofa statute of limi

.opting Dai is' interpretati : •. " ll: , I ! J C

'" J-422

is the proper statute of limitations in this matter, would allow annexations to be challenged in
pcrpeluil i in. Kinj' a,) |iiii|ini) (JM 1 , i\nn n I |i \ icd against apiece of property by Provo City.
This Court finds that this matter falls within the catchall four-year limitation in U.C.A. § 78-1225(3), barring Davis' challenge to the 1978 annexation. Davis has not asserted that thefouryears
should be tolled in any manner. Therefbi e Pi o i< o Cit] 's moti )n to dismiss the Seventh Cause of
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Action in Davis' Amended Complaint is granted. Because Davis is barred by the statute of
limitations, the Court will not address Provo's alternative arguments regarding laches and the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Further, Davis' Rule 56(f) motion is denied because it
requests discovery to determine whether U.C.A. § 10-2-422 is applicable, which this decision
moots. The Court orders Provo City to prepare an order for the Court's signature consistent with
this decision.
Dated this

day of sj«j>

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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